Manual Weapons of Mass Collaboration

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Moreover, it responds to a threat already experienced by Belgium during the First World War. On 22 April , chemical weapons were used for the first time on a large scale on the battlefield close to Ieper Ypres. The effects of First World War are still present in Belgium. It entered into force in Biological weapons , formerly named bacteriological weapons, are devices or vectors carrying biological agents to a target. They use living organisms to spread diseases provoking dead or permanent or temporal incapacity.

Nevertheless, the fact that no country claims currently to possess biological weapons demonstrates the normative reach of this multilateral treaty. Regional instability and conflicts often lie at the heart of armament programmes. The EU can play an important mitigation role through the use of its conflict prevention and management tools.

Moreover, the EU has a broader range of resources and options than any other organization for engaging in active cooperation with third countries. In the EU adopted the Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which sets out a comprehensive framework for all those initiatives. See her MAP blog. I bought the book last night and read the intro and chapter 1 PDF available on their site.

Wigley and Associates: Leadership blogging, citizen media, and weapons of mass collaboration for organizations.


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These changes, among others, are ushering us toward a world where knowledge, power, and productive capability will be more dispersed than at any time in our history-a world where value creation will be fast, fluid, and persistently disruptive. A world where only the connected will survive. A power shift is underway, and a tough new business rule is emerging: Harness the new collaboration or perish.

Those who fail to grasp this will find themselves ever more isolated-cut off from the networks that are sharing, adapting, and updating knowledge to create value. Mass collaboration can empower a growing cohort of connected individuals and organizations to create extraordinary wealth and reach unprecedented heights in learning and scientific discovery. But the new participation will also cause great upheaval, dislocation, and danger for societies, corporations, and individuals that fail to keep up with relentless change.

Growth media is a mixture of sugars , proteins and minerals that provides nutrients for microorganisms to grow. In hospitals, swabs from patients are placed in dishes containing growth medium for diagnostic purposes. Shown this evidence by UNSCOM, Taha admitted to the inspectors that she had grown 19, litres of botulinum toxin ; [48] 8, litres of anthrax ; 2, litres of aflatoxins , which can cause liver failure; Clostridium perfringens , a bacterium that can cause gas gangrene ; and ricin.

Social Networks and Learning: Weapons of Mass Collaboration? by Mark A Wootan - qarirazonyqe.ml

She also admitted conducting research into cholera , salmonella , foot and mouth disease , and camel pox, a disease that uses the same growth techniques as smallpox , but which is safer for researchers to work with. It was because of the discovery of Taha's work with camel pox that the U. The inspectors feared that Taha's team had experimented on human beings. During one inspection, they discovered two primate-sized inhalation chambers, one measuring 5 cubic meters, though there was no evidence the Iraqis had used large primates in their experiments.

During one experiment, the inspectors were told, 12 prisoners were tied to posts while shells loaded with anthrax were blown up nearby. Ritter's team demanded to see documents from Abu Ghraib prison showing a prisoner count. Ritter writes that they discovered the records for July and August were missing.


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  8. In April Iraq provided its first of what would be several declarations of its chemical weapons programs. In August Iraq had declared to the UNSCOM biological inspection team that it did indeed have a biological weapons program but that it was for defensive purposes. After UNSCOM's investigations and the discovery of inreffutable evidence, Iraq was forced to admit for the first time the existence of an offensive biological weapons program.

    Only after General Hussein Kamel al-Majid , Minister of Industry and Minerals and former Director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation, with responsibility for all of Iraq's weapons programs, fled Iraq for Jordan, Iraq was forced to reveal that its biological warfare program was much more extensive than was previously admitted and that the program included weaponization.

    These documents gave further revelation to Iraq's development of VX gas and its attempts to develop a nuclear weapon. However, in April and July , the biological weapons team and UNSCOM Executive Chairman assessed that Iraq's declarations were as yet "unverifiable" and "incomplete and inadequate", seven years after the first declarations were given in In August , Ritter resigned his position as UN weapons inspector and sharply criticized the Clinton administration and the UN Security Council for not being vigorous enough about insisting that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction be destroyed.

    There is considerable debate about whether they were "withdrawn", "expelled" from the country by Iraqi officials as alleged by George W. Bush in his "axis of evil" speech , or they chose to leave because they felt their hands were tied sufficiently to see the mission as hopeless. According to Butler himself in his book Saddam Defiant, it was U. Ambassador Peter Burleigh, acting on instructions from Washington, who suggested Butler pull his team from Iraq in order to protect them from the forthcoming U. In August, , absent effective monitoring, Scott Ritter remarked that Iraq could "reconstitute chemical biological weapons, long-range ballistic missiles to deliver these weapons, and even certain aspects of their nuclear weaponization program.

    In June, , Ritter responded to an interviewer, saying: "When you ask the question, 'Does Iraq possess militarily viable biological or chemical weapons? It is a resounding NO. Can Iraq produce today chemical weapons on a meaningful scale? Can Iraq produce biological weapons on a meaningful scale?

    Ballistic missiles? It is 'no' across the board. So from a qualitative standpoint, Iraq has been disarmed. Ritter later accused some UNSCOM personnel of spying, and he strongly criticized the Bill Clinton administration for misusing the commission's resources to eavesdrop on the Iraqi military. The film was funded by an Iraqi-American businessman who, unknown to Ritter, had received Oil-for-Food coupons from the Iraqi administration.

    Many people were surprised by Ritter's turnaround in his view of Iraq during a period when no inspections were made. During the — build-up to war Ritter criticized the Bush administration and maintained that it had provided no credible evidence that Iraq had reconstituted a significant WMD capability. After that, for four years from to Iraq remained without any outside weapons inspectors. During this time speculations arose that Iraq had actively resumed its WMD programs. In particular, various figures in the George W.

    Bush administration as well as Congress went so far as to express concern about nuclear weapons. Chief weapons inspector Hans Blix said in January that "access has been provided to all sites we have wanted to inspect" and Iraq had "cooperated rather well" in that regard, although "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance of the disarmament.

    Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance. There were no weapon inspections in Iraq for nearly four years after the UN departed from Iraq in , and Iraq asserted that they would never be invited back. In , Saddam stated: "we are not at all seeking to build up weapons or look for the most harmful weapons. Mahdi Obeidi, who created Saddam's nuclear centrifuge program that had successfully enriched uranium to weapons grade before the Gulf War, stated in an op-ed in The New York Times that although Iraqi scientists possessed the knowledge to restart the nuclear program, by the idea had become "a vague dream from another era.

    The United States claimed that Iraq's latest weapons declaration left materials and munitions unaccounted for; the Iraqis claimed that all such material had been destroyed, something which had been stated years earlier by Iraq's highest ranking defector, Hussein Kamel al-Majid. According to reports from the previous UN inspection agency, UNSCOM, Iraq produced metric tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas , VX and sarin ; nearly 25, rockets and 15, artillery shells, with chemical agents, are still unaccounted for.

    10 Terrifying Weapons of Mass Destruction

    In January , United Nations weapons inspectors reported that they had found no indication that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons or an active program. Some former UNSCOM inspectors disagree about whether the United States could know for certain whether or not Iraq had renewed production of weapons of mass destruction.

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    Robert Gallucci said, "If Iraq had [uranium or plutonium], a fair assessment would be they could fabricate a nuclear weapon, and there is no reason for us to assume we would find out if they had. You really can not tell from a satellite image what is going on inside a factory. Since sites had been found which evidenced the destruction of chemical weaponry, UNSCOM was actively working with Iraq on methods to ascertain for certain whether the amounts destroyed matched up with the amounts that Iraq had produced.

    In an attempt to counter the allegations that some WMD arsenals or capability were indeed hidden from inspectors, Scott Ritter would argue later;. There's no doubt Iraq hasn't fully complied with its disarmament obligations as set forth by the Security Council in its resolution. It constitutes bits and pieces of a weapons program which in its totality doesn't amount to much, but which is still prohibited We can't give Iraq a clean bill of health, therefore we can't close the book on their weapons of mass destruction. But simultaneously, we can't reasonably talk about Iraqi non-compliance as representing a de-facto retention of a prohibited capacity worthy of war.

    Ritter also argued that the WMDs Saddam had in his possession all those years ago, if retained, would have long since turned to harmless substances. He stated that Iraqi Sarin and tabun have a shelf life of approximately five years, VX lasts a bit longer but not much longer , and finally he said botulinum toxin and liquid anthrax last about three years.

    He said that Security Council resolution authorised force against Iraq, which was suspended but not terminated by resolution , which imposed continuing obligations on Iraq to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction.

    A material breach of resolution would revive the authority to use force under resolution In resolution the Security Council determined that Iraq was in material breach of resolution because it had not fully carried out its obligations to disarm. Although resolution had given Iraq a final chance to comply, UK Attorney General Goldsmith wrote "it is plain that Iraq has failed so to comply".

    Most member governments of the United Nations Security Council made clear that after resolution there still was no authorization for the use of force. Indeed, at the time was passed, both the U. Ambassador John D. Negroponte was quoted as saying:. There's no "automaticity" and this is a two-stage process, and in that regard we have met the principal concerns that have been expressed for the resolution [ We heard loud and clear during the negotiations the concerns about "automaticity" and "hidden triggers" - the concern that on a decision so crucial we should not rush into military action; that on a decision so crucial any Iraqi violations should be discussed by the Council.

    Let me be equally clear in response, as one of the co-sponsors of the text we have adopted: there is no "automaticity" in this Resolution. The UN itself never had the chance to declare that Iraq had failed to take its "final opportunity" to comply as the U. American President George W. Bush stated that Saddam Hussein had 48 hours to step down and leave Iraq. On May 30, , Paul Wolfowitz stated in an interview with Vanity Fair magazine that the issue of weapons of mass destruction was the point of greatest agreement among Bush's team among the reasons to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

    He said, "The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the U. One is weapons of mass destruction, the second is support for terrorism, the third is the criminal treatment of the Iraqi people. Actually I guess you could say there's a fourth overriding one which is the connection between the first two. In , Scott Ritter , a former UNSCOM weapons inspector heavily criticized the Bush administration and media outlets for using the testimony of alleged former Iraqi nuclear scientist Khidir Hamza , who defected from Iraq in , as a rationale for invading Iraq:.

    We seized the entire records of the Iraqi Nuclear program, especially the administrative records. We got a name of everybody, where they worked, what they did, and the top of the list, Saddam's "Bombmaker" [which was the title of Hamza's book, and earned the nickname afterwards] was a man named Jafar Dhia Jafar, not Khidir Hamza, and if you go down the list of the senior administrative personnel you will not find Hamza's name in there.

    In fact, we didn't find his name at all. Because in , he didn't work for the Iraqi nuclear program. He had no knowledge of it because he worked as a kickback specialist for Hussein Kamel in the Presidential Palace. He goes into northern Iraq and meets up with Ahmad Chalabi. He walks in and says, I'm Saddam's "Bombmaker".

    So they call the CIA and they say, "We know who you are, you're not Saddam's 'Bombmaker', go sell your story to someone else. I got a problem with that, I got a problem with the American media, and I've told them over and over and over again that this man is a documentable fraud, a fake, and yet they allow him to go on CNN , MSNBC , CNBC , and testify as if he actually knows what he is talking about. On June 4, , U. Senator Pat Roberts announced that the U. Select Committee on Intelligence that he chaired would, as a part of its ongoing oversight of the intelligence community, conduct a Review of intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

    Congress, that history would forgive the United States and United Kingdom, even if they were wrong about weapons of mass destruction. He still maintained that "with every fiber of instinct and conviction" Iraq did have weapons of mass destruction. On February 3, , British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw announced an independent inquiry , to be chaired by Lord Butler of Brockwell , to examine the reliability of British intelligence relating to alleged weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. One story in particular, written by Judith Miller , helped persuade the American public that Iraq had WMD: in September she wrote about an intercepted shipment of aluminum tubes which the NYT said were to be used to develop nuclear material.

    Miller's sources were introduced to her by Ahmed Chalabi , an Iraqi exile favorable to a U. It appears that in the cases where Iraqi exiles were used for the stories about WMD were either ignorant as to the real status of Iraq's WMD or lied to journalists to achieve their own ends. But what wasn't wrong was Saddam Hussein had invaded a country, he had used weapons of mass destruction, he had the capability of making weapons of mass destruction, he was firing at our pilots. He was a state sponsor of terror. Removing Saddam Hussein was the right thing for world peace and the security of our country.

    In a speech before the World Affairs Council of Charlotte, NC, on April 7, , President Bush stated that he "fully understood that the intelligence was wrong, and [he was] just as disappointed as everybody else" when U. Intelligence shortly before the invasion of Iraq was heavily used as support arguments in favor of military intervention, with the October C.

    There is little question that Saddam Hussein wants to develop nuclear weapons. Among the contentions he makes in his report are that the government "ordered the September Dossier , a British Government dossier on WMD to be sexed up , to be made more exciting, and ordered more facts to be On May 27, , a secret Defense Intelligence Agency fact-finding mission in Iraq reported unanimously to intelligence officials in Washington that two trailers captured in Iraq by Kurdish troops "had nothing to do with biological weapons.

    We know what the fermenters look like.

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    We know what the tanks, pumps, compressors and other parts look like. The team of experts unanimously found "no connection to anything biological"; one of the experts told reporters that they privately called the trailers "the biggest sand toilets in the world. It is still classified, but a Washington Post report of April 12, disclosed some of the details of the report. According to the Post :. A spokesman for the DIA asserted that the team's findings were neither ignored nor suppressed, but were incorporated in the work of the Iraqi Survey Group, which led the official search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

    General Tommy Franks was quoted as saying: "I think no one in this country probably was more surprised than I when weapons of mass destruction were not used against our troops as they moved toward Baghdad. On February 6, , U. President George W. On May 30, , The U.

    Various nuclear facilities, including the Baghdad Nuclear Research Facility and Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, were found looted in the month following the invasion. Gellman, May 3, On June 20, , the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that tons of uranium , as well as other radioactive materials such as thorium , had been recovered, and that the vast majority had remained on site.

    There were several reports of radiation sickness in the area. It has been suggested that the documents and suspected weapons sites were looted and burned in Iraq by looters in the final days of the war. On September 30, , the U. Iraq Survey Group issued its Final Report. The report found that "The ISG has not found evidence that Saddam possessed WMD stocks in , but [there is] the possibility that some weapons existed in Iraq, although not of a militarily significant capability.

    Senate Armed Services Committee that the group found no evidence that Iraq under Saddam Hussein had produced and stockpiled any weapons of mass destruction since , when UN sanctions were imposed. After he began cooperating with U. He said, "I had to maintain the program to the bitter end. However, it would require a massive investment and a re-creation of thousands of centrifuges in order to reconstitute a full centrifugal enrichment program.

    In a January 26, interview with Tom Brokaw of NBC news, Kay described Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs as being in a "rudimentary" stage.

    Topic: Financing of Proliferation

    He also stated that "What we did find, and as others are investigating it, we found a lot of terrorist groups and individuals that passed through Iraq. Tom, an imminent threat is a political judgment. It's not a technical judgment. I think Baghdad was actually becoming more dangerous in the last two years than even we realized. Saddam was not controlling the society any longer. In the marketplace of terrorism and of WMD, Iraq well could have been that supplier if the war had not intervened. In June , the United States removed 2 tons of low-enriched uranium from Iraq, sufficient raw material for a single nuclear weapon.

    Operation Iraqi Freedom documents refers to some 48, boxes of documents, audiotapes and videotapes that were captured by the U. Many of these documents seem to make clear that Saddam's regime had given up on seeking a WMD capability by the mids. Associated Press reported, "Repeatedly in the transcripts, Saddam and his lieutenants remind each other that Iraq destroyed its chemical and biological weapons in the early s, and shut down those programs and the nuclear-bomb program, which had never produced a weapon.

    Don't think for a minute that we still have WMD. We have nothing. Congressman Peter Hoekstra called for the U. Since the invasion of Iraq, several reported finds of chemical weapons were announced, including half a dozen incidents during the invasion itself. In April , US Marines stumbled across a number of buildings which emitted unusual levels of radiation. Upon close inspection the troops uncovered "many, many drums" containing low-grade uranium, also known as yellowcake.

    According to an expert familiar with UN nuclear inspections, US troops had arrived at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center and the material under investigation had been documented, stored in sealed containers and subject to supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency since A post-war case occurred on January 9, , when Icelandic munitions experts and Danish military engineers discovered 36 mm mortar rounds containing liquid buried in Southern Iraq.

    While initial tests suggested that the rounds contained a blister agent , subsequent analysis by American and Danish experts showed that no chemical agent was present. On May 2, , a shell containing mustard gas was found in the middle of a street west of Baghdad. The Iraq Survey Group investigation reported that it had been previously "stored improperly", and thus the gas was "ineffective" as a useful chemical agent.

    Officials from the Defense Department commented that they were not certain if use was to be made of the device as a bomb. On May 18 it was reported by U. Department of Defense intelligence officials that tests showed the two-chambered shell contained the chemical agent sarin , the shell being "likely" to have contained three to four liters of the substance in the form of its two unmixed precursor chemicals prior to the aforementioned explosion that had not effectively mixed them. Mark Kimmitt , and another U.

    In , hundreds of chemical warheads were recovered from the desert close to the Iran—Iraq border. According to the Washington Post , the munitions "had been buried near the Iranian border, and then long forgotten, by Iraqi troops during their eight-year war with Iran". Officials did not consider the discovery as evidence of an ongoing weapons program that was believed to be in existence before the invasion began.